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Consciousness is deemed a ‘hard’ problem in modern scientific consciousness studies wherever 
it is identified as a metaphysical problem, a problem of first principles, since it is widely 
assumed that all such problems are intractable to the human intellect. If the problem is 
sometimes seen as ‘easy’ this is because not everyone sees it as a metaphysical problem. It was 
christened ‘hard’ by David Chalmers on this basis, that Mind-Matter is a metaphysical 
dilemma and not a problem that can be addressed within the natural sciences. Metaphysics has 
always known that neither Mind nor Matter is a plausible basis for a fundamental theory, for 
the failure of extreme metaphysical positions is what makes the subject so difficult in the first 
place, but philosophers of mind do not always take much notice of metaphysics, and scientists 
may sometimes be contemptuous. There is a view that metaphysical analysis need not be a 
constraint on theories of consciousness and this allows many logically indefensible ideas to 
survive and flourish.  But if we are to honestly face up to the ‘hard’ problem then we must pay 
metaphysics its rightful dues and concede, with Chalmers, that it cannot be solved within the 
worldview or mindset that currently prevails in scientific consciousness studies. This is a 
worldview and mindset for which it has never been possible to solve metaphysical problems 
and it would make no sense if Mind-Matter were to suddenly become the single exception. In 
two short articles for The Journal of Consciousness Studies, ‘Facing up to the problem of 
consciousness’ and ‘Moving on from the problem of consciousness’,1  Chalmers proposes  that 
we cannot hope to do in scientific consciousness studies what we cannot do in metaphysics and 
must settle for a nonreductive theory. He names this approach naturalistic dualism. The name 
suggests that we cannot transcend dualism for a fundamental solution without abanding the 
conception of Nature that currently prevails in scientific consciousness studies.  
 
Opponents of this pessimistic view, if they are to argue from within the same worldview, must 
disregard the results of metaphysical analysis and assume that Mind or Matter are, after all,  
fundamental categories, and hope that we we will eventually discover some scientific evidence 
that this is the case. This position is not easy to sustain. No amount of scientific evidence 
would be enough to alter the fact that this profound assumption is logically indefensible and 
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thus perverse. There can be no evidence to support it unless the universe is paradoxical. If the 
assumption that Mind or Matter are fundamental categories were logically defensible then 
metaphysics would be a simple affair. As it is, and it is quite easy to verify, all metaphysical 
problems are found to be intractable once this assumption has been made. These problems are 
intricately and intimately connected, and every one of them is found to be ‘hard’ in exactly the 
same way. The idea that we might overturn the result of some thousands of years of rational 
analysis by discovering new scientific evidence is incredible, and a clear misunderstanding of 
the relationship between physics and metaphysics. From the point of view of the metaphysician 
to even bother looking for such evidence would be a waste of time. It would simply be a fact 
that all selective conclusions about the world as a whole are undecidable. This is inevitable, 
since all selective, extreme or partial metaphysical views are found to be logically indefensible. 
We cannot choose between them because they are both as bad as each other. Many 
philosophers have concluded that metaphysics is a waste of time for precisely this reason, that 
it does not produce a positive result, but this criticism only serves to show that that its result is 
completely secure. Truly facing up to the problem of consciousness would mean accepting this 
result of metaphysics  as an incontrovertible and directly relevant fact. Naturalistic dualism 
concedes this fact and is an immediate response to it. We would work only on the easy part of 
the problem of consciousness and not bother with metaphysics. In this way we can 
acknowledge the result of metaphysics without having to change our ideas about Nature in any 
way. This cannot be called facing up to the problem, however, for it is designed as a means of 
entirely avoiding it. Facing up to the problem would mean conceding that the intractability of 
Mind-Matter and all other metaphysical problems from within the prevailing worldview is not a 
plausible coincidence. If it is not a plausible coincidence then it must be the case that it would 
be impossible to solve the problem of consciousness without solving all other metaphysical 
problems at the same time. Consciousness would be no more or less important or ‘hard’ than 
any other metaphysical question.  
 
The prevailing worldview in scientific consciousness studies has to be the source of the ‘hard’ 
problem and its associated metaphysical problems; solipsism, freewill, scepticism, knowledge, 
origins, ethics and so on. Its failure as a solution for metaphysics is there for all to see. It is 
logically flawed such that according to reason it must be wrong. It describes a universe that is 
incomprehensible to us. If it is ‘scientific’ or ‘naturalistic’ then it would only be in the same 
sense as is the theory of philostogen. It renders consciousness ‘hard’ in exactly the way that 
Chalmers proposes and demonstrates. Not necessarily intractable, but having no solution that 
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can be reconciled with the worldview that currently prevails in the natural sciences and 
mainstream western metaphysics.     
 
So what is wrong with this worldview? It is often the outcome of an initial assumption stating 
that metaphysical problems such as Mind-Matter are either decidable or intractable, so that 
when we fail to decide them we conclude they are intractable. A great many ‘hard’ problems 
are created by this assumption. It entails that in respect of the Mind-Matter problem we have 
only two options. We can assume that it is decidable and endorse one of two counterposed 
extreme metaphysical positions where all such positions are known to fail, or we can assume 
that it is intractable and walk away. This is the stark choice with which Chalmers presents us. 
No other option would be possible for this worldview, for this is the assumption on which it 
rests.   
 
The assumption that metaphysical questions must be decidable or intractable is not actually 
necessary for science or naturalism. It is so often made, however, that it is also widely 
assumed, as a corollary, that the metaphysically flawed and inevitably nonreductive worldview 
that arises from it must be the only one that can be considered ‘scientific’ or ‘naturalistic’. We 
must then conclude that in order for a theory to be considered ‘scientific’ or ‘naturalistic’ it 
must fail in metaphysics. And so we are led to the idea that for a naturalistic and scientific 
worldview we must disregard the results of human reasoning. But, of course, a little thought 
shows that it is simply not the case that this assumption about metaphysical questions or the 
worldview that emerges from it is uniquely or even necessarily scientific or naturalistic. If a 
worldview can legitimately call itself scientific or naturalistic then it would not inevitably 
follow that it is consistent with the scientific data or survives logical analysis. It may yet be a 
poorly constructed or hopelessly wrong theory. If it is found to have ramifications inconsistent 
with logic and reason then calling it ‘scientific’ or ‘naturalistic’ is not going to make it any 
more plausible. Once we have assumed that metaphysical problems are either intractable or 
decidable, however, then for a ‘scientific’ or ‘naturalistic’ theory of consciousness we must 
stay well clear of metaphysical issues, and we could certainly never revisit this metaphysical 
assumption to examine it more closely. According to our assumption there would be no point in 
doing so. We abandoned metaphysics when we start making assumptions instead of doing the 
calculations. Having made this assumption we have no choice but to conclude, not a little 
ironically, that the problem of consciousness is too ‘hard’ for the natural sciences and scientific 
consciousness studies and that its solution, if there is one, would have to be found elsewhere. 
Thus Chalmers concludes that if professional consciousness studies is to remain ‘scientific’ and 
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‘naturalistic’ then the problem of consciousness must be deemed intractable. We would stop 
looking for a fundamental theory and restrict ourselves to those we would judge scientific or 
naturalistic, where all theories that would qualify under the current rules are known to fail in 
metaphysics. In this way we end up with a consciousness studies that we can proudly call 
scientific and naturalistic and which is doomed to failure for this very reason.   
 
This muddle can be disentangled only if we concede that science is a method and not a set of 
preconceptions about Nature, and that ‘naturalism’ is a rejection of the miraculous and 
paradoxical and not otherwise a limit on our imagination as we try to understand ourselves and 
our world. We do not have to start by assuming that metaphysical problems are intractable, nor 
that their solution would have to contradict our reason or be ‘unscientific’ or ‘unnaturalistic’. 
We would only need to concede that at this time there is something wrong with the way we are 
looking at these problems and thus at Nature herself. This is clearly the case, for otherwise we 
would be able to solve these problems and comprehend Nature.       
 
It remains possible, therefore, as a consequence of all this, to argue that the ‘easy’ part of the 
problem of consciousness would be the more difficult of the two to solve. It would be an 
endless task. We would want to know everything we can know about consciousness by the 
methods of the natural sciences, and then understand the ramifications of this knowledge for 
cosmology, philosophy, physics, neurophysiology, biology, psychology, psychiatry, artificial 
intelligence, mathematics, soteriology, religion, the occult, morality, advertising, education, 
management training, sporting performance and who knows what else. It would be impossible 
to say what would be required to solve this part of the problem other than a lot of time and 
money. There is also a deeper issue. If we cannot solve the ‘hard’ part of the problem in 
metaphysics then there must be a strict limit on our ability to solve the ‘easy’ part of it in any 
other discipline. By such methods we could certainly never hope to learn anything about 
consciousness that would enable us to decide a metaphysical question, and this places a narrow 
limit on what we can learn about consciousness as an imputed third-person or intra-subjective 
phenomenon. Chalmers proposes that we must respect this limit for a naturalistic 
consciousness studies, one that does not immediately drag us off into the murky waters of 
metaphysics and mysticism. It would be an impassable barrier to knowledge standing between 
us and a fundamental theory. But this pessimistic view is not a result of analysis. It is an 
artefact of an unnecessary assumption about metaphysics and Nature. It is a man-made barrier, 
not a reason to suppose that a theory which is fundamental, scientific and naturalistic would be 
impossible.      
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The ‘hard’ part of the problem is more clear-cut, or it can be made so. It is a finite problem, a 
problem of first principles, a single problem requiring a unique once-and-for-all solution. 
Crucially, it has not yet been demonstrated that it is intractable. We can concede that it cannot 
be solved in scientific consciousness studies as currently defined and practised, even insist upon 
it, and also concede that it is a metaphysical problem, intractable for two millennia or more in 
the mainstream of European philosophical thought. Yet we can still suppose that it is tractable. 
This is because it is not yet certain that the prevailing paradigm in European thought and 
modern scientific consciousness studies, for which these problems are intractable, is in fact 
naturalistic. Indeed, the intractability of these problems makes it obvious that it is not. If a 
scientific theory does not describe Nature correctly then it is not  naturalistic in anything more 
than intent. If a theory of consciousness is beset by metaphysical problems then according to 
reason it is wrong, and if it is wrong then it is not a description of Nature. If naturalism is the 
claim that all phenomena are natural and subject to natural laws, and if science is defined as a 
method of data-collection and theory-generation, then unless the universe is paradoxical a truly 
scientific and naturalistic consciousness studies would encounter no terminally ‘hard’ 
problems. Indeed, this would be a crucial test of whether it is naturalistic, that it gives an 
unproblematic description of Nature. The task for the natural sciences is to establish what is 
the case, and if we do not yet understand Nature fully then we are forced to remain open-
minded as to what ‘naturalistic’ should mean in relation to a fundamental theory of 
consciousness. If we accept this then the door is thrown open to solutions not available to us 
when we restrict our ideas about consciousness to exclude those that do not seem  ‘naturalistic’ 
to us according to some conjectural view of Nature that does not work in metaphysics. For a 
solution we need not abandon the idea that all phenomena are natural, merely accept that there 
is much we do not yet know about Nature. Chalmers must be correct in saying that for an 
orthodox scientific consciousness studies we must settle for a nonreductive theory, for if we set 
out to pursue the problem of consciousness to its end we cannot avoid becoming enmired in 
metaphysics and religion. But this would mean that the solution for consciousness would have 
to be sought beyond consciousness studies, in metaphysics and religion. This does not seem like 
progress. Do we really want to emasculate consciousness studies in this way? It would then be 
beyond the remit of scientific consciousness studies to declare consciousness an ‘easy’ or a 
‘hard’ problem, since which it is would depend entirely on how difficult it would be to solve in 
metaphysics or religion.  Narrowing the scope of consciousness studies in this way in order to 
protect an incomprehensible naturalism would not be necessary if we say that science is a 
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method and not a theory, and that naturalism is a commitment to the laws of Nature and not a 
statement of what they are.              
 
There is then some reason to think that the ‘hard’ problem might not be terminally difficult. 
The difficulty may be only that our incorrect preconceptions about Nature make it so. Is this 
not certain? It is not as if we need more data. If we cannot solve this problem then where else 
can the fault lie than in our preconceptions about Nature? For the natural sciences we usually 
begin by assuming that ‘Mind’ and ‘Matter’ are categories within which we can place all 
natural phenomena. This is to assume that we know a lot more about Nature than we actually 
do. It is a metaphysical assumption, a gamble, and there is nothing particularly scientific or 
naturalistic about it. Only if we allow ourselves to be dragged into metaphysics and religion 
can we abandon this assumption, for here we find a different idea. We need not abandon 
naturalism and science, only certain orthodoxies, preconceptions, assumptions and dogmas. As 
for whether we would be abandoning our traditional metaphysics, the intractability of the 
problem of consciousness and other related problems is conclusive proof that our usual 
metaphysical approach is fundamentally flawed. Why would we not want to abandon it? Every 
one of its problems is caused by the assumption that some distinction or categorisation such as 
Mind-Matter is fundamental, while the only available solution for them would be to assume 
otherwise. The problem is only this. In order to assume that Mind-Matter and all such 
distinctions are emergent we would have to abandon the assumption that metaphysical 
problems are decidable or intractable, and this cannot be done within the prevailing paradigm.  
 
We can briefly examine one case to illustrate the possibility of a different approach. In one of 
its guises the problem of consiousness appears as the problem of matter-mind causation. The 
idea that a corporeal phenomenon can act causally on a mental phenomenon goes largely 
unquestioned in the sciences, but it is no less problematic than the idea that mind can act on 
matter. The mismatch of phenomena is the same in both directions. One is material and the 
other is not, and we have no theory for how this gap can be bridged by any form of causation 
even at the moment of their creation. Not even the existence of consciousness can be 
established in physics. But we can use our reason. In metaphysics we find it impossible to 
reduce Mind and Matter one to the other or to make them identical, and their causal 
relationship seems to be miraculous. Unless, that is, we hypothesise another phenomenon, 
something that cannot be classified as Mind or Matter. Given an extra ingredient we no longer 
have to suppose that there is a paradoxical causal link between the physical and the mental 
worlds, nor that one is fundamental and the other emergent. This is a plausible solution because 
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it represents a paradigmatic change of approach. For the prevailing view we must assume that 
one or both of Mind and/or Matter takes precedence in the evolution of the universe. Usually 
one would be original and cause the other. As this idea does not make sense all sorts of 
problems arise for it that seem impregnable to human reason and cannot be solved in 
metaphysics, consciousness studies or physics. It cannot be a correct assumption. The present 
state of western academic metaphysics and consciousness studies represents a highly successful 
reductio argument against it. With a third phenomenon ontologically prior to mental and 
corporeal phenomena, however, we can suppose that these two emerge as dual-aspects in 
mutual-dependence and can be described within a dual-aspect theory very much as Chalmers 
proposes. We need not imagine that either can exist independently, that one or the other sprang 
into existence from nothing at all, nor that one directly causes the other. They would share a 
common source and a mediated relationship.  
 
This is mysticism, of course, the ‘nondual’ or advaita view, the doctrine of ‘dependent 
origination ’, the realm of Lao Tsu’s Tao. In the context of consciousness studies it has been 
called ‘relative phenomenalism’.  It would also be very nearly the solution proposed by 
Chalmers’ with his dual-aspect theory of information, where these two aspects would be the 
mental and the corporeal. It is only that now it would contain an extra ingredient, a third 
theoretical primitive, one that would allow the theory to be fundamental. As well as the parts 
there would be the whole. So similar is this to Chalmers’ theory, being merely an extension of 
it, and so obvious is it that it might be a solution for the problem, that it can only be an 
unnecessarily narrow interpretation of the words ‘scientific’ and ‘naturalistic’ that prevent it 
from being a well-regarded theory in scientific consciousness studies. In one of its guises it is 
Middle Way Buddhism, and so the reason cannot be a lack of publicity. Its lack of credibility 
seems more likely to be due to certain assumptions about science and naturalism that prevent 
those who make them from seeing the full possibilities of Nature.   
 
It is at least possible, therefore, that the ‘hard’ problem of consciousness is a tractable one and 
even, at the level of principles, a fairly straightforward one. The solution would be to assume 
that the Buddha and Lao Tsu knew what they were talking about. It is often forgotten that they 
predicted the Mind-Matter problem, our inability to reduce this dualism, and all such 
metaphysical dilemmas, when they told us that the categories of thought are not fundamental, 
that all distinctions are emergent. Even if we do not believe them we can at least be sure, after 
all this time, that Chalmers is right, and that it would be impossible to gainsay them.  
____ 
